Those Who Carry Out the Plans Should Make the Plans
Why project success needs people readiness, not just data readiness
In what feels like another life, I studied Business and Finance. I was young, curious, and absorbing everything I could about how organisations worked and why some of them worked better than others. It was during that time I came across Peter Drucker and Tom Peters. Drucker shaped how I thought about organisations and the people inside them. From Peters, one line lodged itself somewhere permanent.
“Those who carry out the plans should make the plans.”
I’ve thought about that line in boardrooms, on project reviews, at customer events, and in conversations where someone is explaining, with complete confidence, why the new system is going to transform the business. I think about it every time I see an AI deployment that looks impressive on a slide and doesn’t survive contact with the people it was built for.
It’s not a line about technology. It’s a line about respect — for the expertise, the context, and the judgement of the people who actually do the work. And it is, in my experience, the most frequently ignored principle in the management of change.
This Failure Mode Is Not New
Let’s be honest about something. The failure mode we’re describing when we talk about AI projects ending up in the PoC graveyard is not new. It is not a product of machine learning complexity, data pipeline debt, or foundation model hype. It is a pattern that has been repeating itself across every major wave of enterprise technology for the last thirty years.
ERP systems that were technically correct and operationally ignored. CRM platforms that the sales team logged into once and then routed around via spreadsheets. Lean manufacturing programmes that consultants designed, managers approved, and shop floor workers gently buried. The technology changed. The failure mode didn’t.
In each case, the pattern was the same. A solution was designed by people who understood the technology and approved by people who controlled the budget. The people who were going to use it every day — the ones who knew where the edge cases lived, where the workarounds had evolved, and why the process worked the way it did rather than the way the manual said it should — were consulted late, informed later, and left to figure it out for themselves once the project team had moved on.
IT projects have been going live or dying for decades. What has changed is the amplification. AI deployments carry bigger expectations, bigger investment, and bigger visibility than a CRM rollout ever did. The failure, when it comes, is correspondingly louder — and the case study about what went wrong gets written faster.
The Quiet Failure
There is a specific kind of AI failure that deserves its own name. Not the dramatic kind — the model that produces obviously wrong results, the bias scandal, the infrastructure collapse. The quiet kind. The proof of concept that worked beautifully in the demo, received senior sign-off, and then never made it to production.
The PoC graveyard is full of technically impressive work. Models that performed well on the test set. Dashboards that visualised the right things. Business cases that stacked up on a spreadsheet. None of it survived — not because the technology failed, but because the organisation wasn’t ready to receive it.
Nobody had been asked whether the process the model was designed to improve was actually the process people ran. Nobody had involved the support team who would have to explain the system’s recommendations to confused customers. Nobody had thought about what happened when the model got it wrong and someone needed to know why.
The people who would carry out the plan had not been asked to make it. And so, quietly and without drama, they didn’t carry it out either.
The Half of Readiness Nobody Talks About
There is a conversation I have frequently about data readiness — about EDA¹, about the gap between data storage and data strategy, about the things that have to be true before a model can do useful work. That conversation is important and underserved, and it is a prerequisite for AI that’ll deliver value.
But data readiness is only one side of the coin. The other side is people readiness. And in my experience it receives a fraction of the attention.
People readiness asks different questions to the ones we usually focus on. Do the people who will use this system understand what it is doing and why? Do they trust it enough to act on its recommendations — or will they systematically override it, quietly and without logging the fact that they’ve done so? Do they have a genuine channel to raise concerns, flag errors, and feed back what they’re seeing on the ground — and do they feel ownership over the system, or merely obligation toward it? These are not soft questions. They are the questions that determine whether the technical work translates into business value or sits on a server being politely ignored.
There is also the black box problem. People do not trust what they cannot see into. If a system produces a recommendation and nobody can explain why — not in general terms, not in the language of the person being asked to act on it — then the most rational response is to ignore it. Not because the person is resistant to change, but because professional judgement requires understanding. A clinician, an underwriter, a logistics manager, a credit analyst — none of them can be expected to stake their reputation on an output they cannot interrogate. Explainability is not a technical nice-to-have. It is a precondition for trust, and trust is a precondition for adoption. Drucker’s observation that culture eats strategy for breakfast was not a warning about bad strategies. It was a warning about what happens when the human layer is treated as a variable rather than a foundation — and it applies here with full force.
An AI system without people readiness is like a well-engineered road built in the wrong direction. The construction is sound. Nobody uses it. The route everyone actually takes is the muddy path that existed before the contractors arrived.
Inclusion Is Not a Ceremony
When organisations talk about involving users in an AI deployment, they often mean something narrower than they should. A workshop near the start. A sign-off meeting near the end. A training session the week before go-live. Boxes ticked. Change management complete.
That is not inclusion. That is notification with a collaborative wrapper around it.
Genuine inclusion means the people closest to the process are in the room when the use case is defined. It means their knowledge of how the work actually happens — not how it is documented, but how it is actually done, with all its workarounds, exceptions, and institutional memory — shapes the design. It means their concerns about what happens when the model is wrong are taken seriously as design constraints, not managed as resistance to be overcome.
The winemaker who walked in with a printout challenging Clare’s model — a story I wrote about in an earlier post on data readiness — was not being obstructive. He was being exactly what a domain expert is supposed to be — the person who knows things the model doesn’t, and who will not pretend otherwise just because the accuracy metric looked good. That challenge made the system better. It surfaced a failure mode in Premium recall that would have cost the winery real money. It earned the model a place in the operation rather than a quiet demotion to the corner of a server room.
That dynamic — expert challenge leading to system improvement — is only possible when the people who carry out the plans feel authorised to question them.
A Trophy Is Not a Deployment
An AI system that goes live and then stays static is not a deployment. It is a trophy.
Real-world conditions change. The distribution of incoming data shifts. The business process the model was trained on evolves. Edge cases accumulate. The model that was fit for purpose in January is carrying assumptions from January into December, and nobody has checked whether those assumptions still hold.
The feedback loop is not a nice-to-have that gets added in a later phase. It is the mechanism by which the system earns continued trust, adapts to reality, and improves over time. And it only functions if the people using the system have a genuine channel to report what they are seeing — the errors, the gaps, the cases where the recommendation didn’t match the operational reality — and confidence that those reports will be acted on.
This is continuous improvement applied to AI. It is not a new idea. It is Toyota’s production system, Deming’s quality cycle, ITIL’s Continual Improvement practice — the basic principle that the people closest to the process are its best source of intelligence about where it is failing. ITIL frames this as a structured loop: identify opportunities, take action, measure outcomes, and feed the learning back in. The same logic applies here, with one important addition. What is new is the requirement to apply it to a system that learns — which means that the feedback the frontline provides does not just inform the next process review. It shapes what the model learns next.
Those who carry out the plans should not just make them. They should improve them. Continuously. With a mechanism that makes their input count.
When Change Has Actually Taken Hold
Throughout my career I have always taken pleasure in watching technology, when done right, change a business for the better. Seeing people work in a different, more productive way after a deployment — there is a quiet pride in that moment. A successful AI deployment in a business process does not look like a technology project that has gone live. It looks like a change that has taken hold. It becomes just the way things are done now. Over time, this new way becomes part of the fabric of the organisation — and then it disappears. It stops being the AI project. It is simply how work gets done. Quiet AI. Boring AI. That is what success looks like.
The people using the system understand what it is doing well enough to work with it intelligently — to know when to trust it, when to question it, and when to escalate. They have been part of the design process in a meaningful enough way that the system reflects how they actually work, not how someone assumed they worked. They have a channel to feed back what they are seeing, and evidence that the channel is listened to.
To achieve this, the leaders overseeing the deployment cannot simply hand it over to a technology team and declare it done. They have to accept that adoption is a longer and less linear process than implementation, and that their job after go-live is to create the conditions for it — removing blockers, taking concerns seriously, celebrating the early wins that build confidence in the wider team, and building a feedback loop worth listening to.
And somewhere in the governance structure, someone owns the agent — or the model, or the system — not as infrastructure to be maintained but as a product to be evolved. Someone who can answer, six months after go-live, whether the system is doing what it was supposed to do, what it has learned, and what the next iteration looks like.
None of this is complicated. Most of it has been known for decades. Tom Peters was writing about it before the internet existed. The reason it keeps being rediscovered is that the technology changes faster than the organisations adopting it do — and in the rush to demonstrate capability, the human layer gets treated as an afterthought rather than a foundation.
Closing Thought
AI is not different from any other technology introduction in the most important way: it succeeds or fails on adoption, and adoption is a human problem before it is a technical one.
Data readiness matters. Model selection matters. Infrastructure matters. But none of it delivers value if the people who are supposed to use the system don’t trust it, weren’t involved in building it, and have no way to improve it once it’s live.
The PoC graveyard will keep filling up as long as organisations treat change management as the last item on the project plan rather than the first.
Those who carry out the plans should make the plans. It was true when Tom Peters wrote it. It is still true now.
Create the future with all your stakeholders. No black boxes. No PoC graveyards.
Change management has to be built in, not bolted on. And it starts and ends with your people.
¹ EDA — Exploratory Data Analysis: The process of examining a dataset before building a model — profiling its structure, spotting missing values, identifying outliers, and understanding distributions. Think of it as the due diligence phase: the work that tells you whether your data is actually fit for the purpose you have in mind, before you commit to building anything on top of it. Finding the signal in the noise.





